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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the welfare effects of information computed from experimental methods eliciting willingness-to-
pay. First, a theoretical model shows that the size of the welfare variation is related to the elasticity of the demand 
under the absence of information about a characteristic. Second, our estimates indicate that consumer demand from a 
laboratory auction is more price-elastic than time-series demand for similar products. As a result, the welfare change 
directly derived from individual willingness-to-pay is overestimated compared to the welfare change linked to an 
approach combining time-series demand with the mean willingness-to-pay premium.
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     1. Introduction 
It has become regular practice to elicit consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) values to make 
inferences about the effectiveness of policies such as product bans, safety/quality standards, 
mandatory labeling, and taxes. However, many experimental papers that provide WTP 
estimates do not actually derive welfare measures associated with such policies. Good policy 
requires not only good estimates of WTP, but also requires reliable welfare estimation for 
measuring the impacts of regulatory tools. 
Some recent studies have begun to estimate value of information about a product 
characteristic (or welfare variation linked to additional information) from experimental 
auction approaches that provide estimates of each participating individual’s WTP. Examples 
include Colson et al. (2008), Huffman et al. (2003 and 2007), Lusk et al. (2005), Lusk and 
Marette (2010), Masters and Sanogo (2002), Rousu et al. (2004 and 2007), Rousu and 
Shogren (2006) and Marette et al. (2008a and 2008b). These studies are important for public 
debate, but there has yet to be much work examining the validity of the approach used by 
these authors to calculate the welfare effects of public policies.  The limited number of papers 
on the topic makes it difficult to reach any conclusion regarding the validity of the welfare 
measures. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by questioning the robustness of welfare 
estimation from two different approaches using WTPs from the same experiment. First, a 
theoretical model shows that the size of welfare variation is related to the elasticity of the 
demand under the absence of information about a characteristic. We then discuss how welfare 
effects of an information revelation policy can be derived from different approaches for the 
same data set coming from an experiment.  
We compare these approaches in terms of the consumer surplus changes linked to 
information revelation about a characteristic. We show that welfare variations derived 
directly from individual WTP values are likely to be overestimated compared to the ones 
combining a times-series demand and the mean willingness-to-pay premium from the 
laboratory. Indeed, our estimates show that individual WTPs derived from experimental 
auctions suggest a more price-elastic demand curve than the one implied from time-series 
data of similar products. The price-elasticity of the initial demand before the revelation of any 
information is an important determinant of the size of the welfare change. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce a theoretical model showing the 
relationship between the elasticity of the demand and changes in consumer welfare resulting 
from an information provision policy. The next section introduces the methods to estimate 
welfare changes.  Then, an application is presented.  The last section concludes. 
 
2. A Simple Theoretical Model 
This section introduces a simple theoretical model to illustrate the role of the demand 
elasticity in determining the welfare effects of a particular regulation. The regulatory scenario 
focuses on the value of information revelation via a mandatory label.  The label conveys 
information about a risk linked to a product, when consumers are initially unaware of a 
problem before the implementation of the mandatory label. It is assumed that there are no 
close substitutes to the product if consumers want to avoid the product concerned by the risk. 
The results of this section could be extended to other information contexts for consumers, 
other regulatory instruments (like the Pigouvian tax) and/or other consumption possibilities 
with substitutes. 
Demand of a representative consumer is derived from a quasi-linear utility function 
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The terms ,0 ab>  capture the immediate satisfaction from consuming quantities of the good, 
Q, and v is the numeraire. The parameter e  represents the additional disutility (or the utility 
gain with e<0 linked to a product with a positive characteristic) linked to product 
consumption. The effects of this disutility is captured by the term  IeQ − . The parameter I 
represents knowledge of the specific characteristic. If consumers are not informed of the 
specific characteristic then I = 0. Conversely, I = 1 implies that consumers are informed of 
the specific characteristic and can internalize the quality change and adjust consumption 
accordingly. 
  The maximization of the utility function subject to a budget constraint (defined by 
R=pQ+v, where R is the income and p is the price of the Q) yields a demand function for the 
representative consumer. When the consumer is ignorant with I = 0, the inverse demand for 
the regular product is given by   
   0() pQ ab Q =− ,           ( 2 )  
where b is the slope of the inverse demand. Assuming perfectly elastic supply at a price  1 P , 
(which implies constant return to scale and zero profits for producers), the equilibrium 
quantity is  1 () /
A Qa P b =− . The consumer’ surplus is given by  1 (, , 0 )
AA UQ R P Q −=  
2
1 () / ( 2 ) aP b − . By taking into account the cost of ignorance defined by 
A eQ −  (see Foster and 
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  When the consumer is informed with I = 1, the inverse demand for the regular 
product is given by   
   1() pQ a e b Q =−− .           ( 4 )  
For an equilibrium price  1 P , the equilibrium quantity is  1 () /
B Qa e P b =− − . Under the 
absence of ignorance, the consumer’ surplus is defined by  1 (, , 1 )
BB UQ R P Q −  and equal to the 
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With I=1, the per-unit damage from consumption is internalized. The welfare variation linked 
to the information revealed to consumers can be measure by the welfare comparison, 
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  The equation (6) shows that revealing information leads to a social benefit because 
consumers internalize the risk e in their consumption decisions. This simple expression 
shows that only the per-unit damage e and the slope b of the demand influence the size of the 
welfare variation. The more inelastic the demand at price  1 P  (namely, the larger the 
parameter b), the lower is the welfare variation,  10 WW − , since the internalization of the 
damage (with I=1) leads to a relatively low reaction with an inelastic demand curve.
 1  
                                                            
1 The demand defined in (2) and used in figure 1 is linear, where the estimate of the elasticity is a local 
approximation. An alternative specification could be to consider non-linear demand,  1 (1 ) Qp I e
ε φ β =+ , 2 
 
  Figure 1 illustrates the result of implied by equation (6), with two types of demand 
curves  0() pQ and  0() pQ  for which slope b varies. In the initial situation A without 
information (I=0), there is a similar level of consumption 
A Q   for both demands with 
01 0 () ()
AA pQ pQ P == , and a similar cost of ignorance represented by the area (-e0Q
Ac’). The 
initial welfare before the revelation of information is defined by the area (aAP1-e0Q
Ac’) for 
the thin curve ( 0() pQ) and by the area (a2AP1-e0Q
Ac’) for the bold curve ( 0() pQ ).The 
welfare after the revelation of information is defined by the area ((a-e)BP1) for the new-thin 
curve ( 1() pQ) and by the area ((a2 -e)CP1) for the new-bold curve ( 1() pQ). The welfare 
variation brought by the information revelation is defined by the area (e0Q
Ac’- aAB(a-e)) for 
the thin curve ( 0() pQ) and by the area (e0Q
Ac’- a2AC(a2-e)) for the bold curve ( 0() pQ ). As 
the area aAB(a-e) is larger than the area (a2AC(a2-e)), the positive-welfare variation with the 
bold curve is higher than the welfare variation with the thin curve. 
  



























  At point A, the bold curve ( 0() pQ ) is more elastic compared to the thin curve 
( 0() pQ), which leads to a larger reduction in consumption with  
C Q  greater than 
B Q  when 
the information is revealed and leads to a similar damage e internalized in demand. The 
resulting welfare variation is higher with the bold curve than with the thin curve. 
  Figure 1 confirms the result given by equation (6). The question now relates to how 
one can estimate the size of the risk, e, and the slope of the demand curve.  The parameter e 
in equation (6) can be estimated by using experimental economics approaches in which 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
where φ  is the information elasticity and ε  is the price elasticity of demand and e is the value given to the 
additional characteristic.   3 
 
consumer WTP is compared in conditions with and without information. The equation (6) 
also indicates that something must be known about the slope of the demand curve, b, to arrive 
at welfare estimates.  This slope can be estimated using WTP data from the experiment itself 
or can be used using more traditional econometric approaches in relying on time series data.   
 
3. Two Approaches for Estimating Surplus Changes 
In this section, we compare two approaches using WTPs from the same experiment for 
estimating the welfare effects of information revelation presented in figure 1. 
   Approach 1  
  Approach 1 directly uses individual estimates of WTP.  Let  ,0 i WTP  and  ,1 i WTP  
indicate individual i’s willingness-to-pay for a product before and after the revelation of 
information, respectively. For a price  1 P , consumer i derives utility, ,0 1 i WTP P − , under the 
absence of information,  ,1 1 i WTP P − , with full information, and zero otherwise (i.e., the utility 
of non-purchase is normalized to zero).  
Under the absence of information, the consumer chooses the option generating the 
highest utility, namely  
,0 ,0 1 max{ ,0} ii CS WTP P =−          ( 7 )    
After taking into account the cost of ignorance,  ,1 ,0 () ii i JW T P W T P −  where Ji  is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 if individual i is predicted to have chosen the product at P1 , the  
total welfare without information is  
  ,0 ,0 1 ,1 ,0 max{ ,0} ( ) i ii i i CS WTP P J WTP WTP =− + −       ( 8 )  
With the information revealed about a characteristic, the consumer chooses the option 
generating the highest utility, namely  
,1 ,1 1 max{ ,0} ii CS WTP P =− .          ( 9 )    
In the latter case, there is no cost of ignorance. The welfare variation linked to the 
information provision is defined by  ,0 ,1 i i CS CS − .  By taking into account the L participants to 
an experiment and N the number of unit purchased over a period of time in a country, the 
welfare is equal to 
1, 1 1 , 0 1 , 1 , 0
1
(/ )[ m a x { , 0 }m a x { , 0 } ( ) ]
L
ii i i i
i
CS N L WTP P WTP P J WTP WTP
=
Δ= − − − − − ∑ . (10) 
  One way to make a possible link between equations (6) and (10) is to estimate a price 
elasticity of the demand implied by the auction data before the revelation of information. A 
demand function in the form of a histogram may be defined by taking a decreasing order of 
the  ,0 i WTP  for i=1,..,L with the cumulative quantity Qn  equal to n for the n
th-highest WTP. 
From this ordered cumulative distribution of WTP, an estimation of the elasticity  l β  can be 
determined with the econometric model,  
  0 ln( ) ln( ) WTP Q α βξ =+ +,          ( 1 1 )  
where  0 WTP  is the vector of all ordered  ,0 i WTP >0 with i=1,..,L, Q is the corresponding the 
cumulative quantity Qn and ξ  is the term of errors assumed uncorrelated across observations. 
Note that the estimation of (11) focus on the slope of the curve fitted to the histogram with 
the horizontal axis representing quantities and a vertical axis representing the ordered WTP.
2 
Of course the calculation of the welfare change in (10) does not actually rely on the elasticity 
                                                            
2 Lusk and Schroeder (2006) provide an alternative way to estimate elasticities from experiments.  4 
 
estimate  l β  given by equation (11). However, by estimating equation (11), we can gain 
insight into the extent to which the elasticity of demand is driving the welfare estimate given 
by (10).   
  Approach 2 
  The approach 2 relies on a combination of an elasticity of demand obtained from 
times-series economics and the average WTP value obtained from the experiment. For the 
demand elasticity, we use “well established” estimates of aggregate demand estimated via 
traditional time-series econometrics.  Average WTP by the experimental auctions can be used 
to calculate the parameter e defined in (1), which in turn can be used to determine the 
welfare effects of information or public policy.  
   In particular, with approach 2, the parameter a and b in (2) can be determined by 
classical calibration methods using existing data on the price elasticity of the demand and 
equilibrium prices and quantities of the product.  Using existing data on the quantity  ˆ Q of the 
product sold over a period, the average price P1 observed over the period, and the direct price 
elasticity  ε   (/ ) ( / ) dQ dp p Q = ) obtained from time-series econometric estimates, the 
calibration leads to estimated values for the demand equal to  
1 ˆ 1/ / bQ P ε =−   and 
1 ˆ ab QP =+  . 
Note that the parameter b   is inversely related to the elasticity,  ε . 
  Empirically, the parameter e is determined by WTP data coming from the 
experiment with values  ,0 i WTP  and  ,1 i WTP  indicating individual i’s willingness-to-pay for the 
product before and after the revelation of information as described for the approach 1. The 
relative variation in WTP based on the experiment provides a measure of the inverse demand 
shift,  100 [( ) ( ) ] /( ) E WTP E WTP E WTP δ =− , where E denotes the expected value or the 
average.  Now, note that the inverse demand curves can be viewed conceptually as WTP 
curves, where the price can be replaced with WTP.  Thus, using the inverse demands in 
equations (2) and (4), the relative price variation is equal to the inverse demand shift defined 
by  100 [( ) ( ) ] / ( )
AAA pQ pQ pQ δ −= , which, after manipulating equations (2) and  (4) leads to 
the estimation  1 eP δ =−  . By using  
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The higher the elasticity in absolute value, the higher is the welfare variation linked to the 
information. Despite differences, equations (10) and (12) can be estimated by using data 
linked to the same experiment providing information about  0 WTP  and  1 WTP. Equation (10) 
uses  0 WTP  , 1 WTP, N and  1 P , while equation (12) uses  0 WTP  , 1 WTP, and 
1 ˆ ,, QP ε . 
 
4. Empirical Application and Results 
In this section, we first restrict our attention to an application in which disaggregate data for 
each individual on WTP was obtained using a multiple choice list. Similar data might also 
come from an open-ended willingness-to-pay question or from experimental auctions (see 
Lusk and Shogren (2007) for an in-depth discussion on experimental auctions).  
The particular application studied here relates to the presence of methyl-mercury in 
fish.  Methyl-mercury, an organic form of mercury, is a toxic compound that can be found in 
fish.  If significant prenatal exposure occurs, ingestion of methyl-mercury can alter fetal brain 
development.  As such, regulators have considered issuing specific advisories/labels directed 5 
 
toward vulnerable groups (small children, pregnant women, and women of childbearing age) 
to avoid long-lived, predatory fish because of high levels of mercury contamination. 
We used data from the experiments presented in Marette et al. (2008 a, b and c). The 
data consist of WTP obtained from multiple choice lists from French women for cans of tuna 
under different information treatments (before and after a message revelation). Conceptually, 
we are calculating the welfare effects linked to the revelation of information about the 
mercury in tuna.
3 
Table 1 shows consumer welfare changes from information revelation about methyl-
mercury. Estimations of welfare are determined with a similar price P1 for both approaches.  
 
Table 1.  Changes in Welfare from Providing Information (in €)  
  Approach 1    Approach 2 
Price elasticity 
estimation 
l β = -1.08
 ***,a 
l β = -2.236
***,b 
 ε = -0.668
***,c 
Changes in welfare 
d       13,598,098  2,659,767 
Notes: ***  marks significance at the 1% level.   
a With all WTP linked to the experiments. 
b With all WTP linked to the experiments without a few extreme points,  
where participants always accepted tuna whatever the offered amount of substitute. 
c LA/AIDS econometric estimation based on time series demand (see Marette et al, 2008c). 
d Consumer surplus variation for year 2006 (€). The approach one uses all the WTP linked to 
the experiment including all the extreme points. 
 
 
Table 1 shows a positive net welfare gain from informing households of the risk. The 
difference in welfare estimates between valuation under approaches 1 and 2 is relatively 
large. The welfare variation is higher under approach 1, because of a higher price-elasticity in 
absolute value under approach 1 than the one coming from the time-series under approach 2. 
Indeed, the findings of equation (6) and figure 1 are confirmed by table 1 and the estimations 
of the price elasticity of demand. Recall that, under approach 1, the computation of the 
welfare variation given by (10) does not use the elasticity l β  computed under alternative 
possibilities (see the notes of table 1), but these values offer a clue for explaining the result 
via the elasticity of the initial demand.  
  To determine the extent to which the results in table 1 might hold up in other 
applications, it is useful to compare demand elasticities from another experimental study to 
time-series estimates.  In particular, we turn to the obtained from an experimental auction 
experiment conducted in France conducted in 2008 in which people bid to buy Yogurt by 
indication their maximum WTP (see details in Marette et al., 2010, and in Roosen et al., 
2010). The direct elasticity computed from the equation (11) under approach 1 is equal to  l β = 
-1.669 and statistically significant at 1% level, while price elasticities computed from time-
                                                            
3 As this damage concerns 50.5% of consumers (namely, small children, pregnant women, and women of 
childbearing age), we assume that only these consumers react to the information. The number N of unit 
purchased over a period by this subgroup (used in equation (10)) is selected to correspond to the overall 
consumption  ˆ Q /2 of the 50.5% of consumers over a year (used in equation (12)). The surplus of non-concerned 
consumers (49.5% of consumers) does not change since the price  1 P  is constant.  6 
 
series by Bouamra-Mechemache et al. (2008) are equal to  ε = -0.126 (in table 6) or  ε = -
0.188 (in table A4).  
  These direct-price elasticities confirm the findings of table 1 by suggesting higher 
elasticities (in absolute value) linked to experimental studies as compared to the time-series 
estimates of demand for Yogurt in France. Once more, demand coming from the experiment 
(under the approach 1) seems much more elastic compared to the time-series demand 
entailing potential-welfare variations higher under approach 1 than under approach 2. 
Elasticities from experiments or disaggregate scanner data are much more elastic than those 
from traditional time-series approaches. Disaggregate scanner data concern products that are 
have many more substitutes, which results in more elastic demand.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper showed that the direct price elasticities of demand are essential determinants of 
welfare effects of information revelation policies, and that the elasticity of demand seems to 
systematically differ across experimental studies and more traditional estimates from time-
series econometrics. Although suggestive, our study is not exhaustive, which means that we 
cannot reach a definitive conclusion and more studies are necessary for confirming these 
findings.  
  There are two main implications linked to this paper. First, an adequate lab 
experiment consists in choosing a product “representative” of existing products in 
supermarkets regarding brands, quality and/or possible substitutes. If market data are 
available before the experiment, selecting a product with a relative low-price elasticity could 
help partially impede the (likely) high-price elasticity of the initial demand emerging from 
the lab.  
  The other implication is that researchers should consider calculating welfare changes 
using several approaches in an effort to produce more reliable and robust inferences. 
Researchers commonly calculate welfare changes from experiments only (according to the 
approach 1), but our results suggest that they should also consider the range of welfare 
estimates that result from combining time-series elasticities and experimental data. Several 
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